The Future of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Prabowo Subianto: A New Era of Geopolitical Navigation
The 2024 election of Prabowo Subianto as Indonesia’s president has ignited significant discussions regarding the trajectory of Indonesia’s foreign policy over the next five years. Set to be inaugurated on October 20, 2024, Prabowo’s leadership marks a potential turning point, particularly given his military background and firm stance on national security. His presidency is poised to bring about substantial shifts in how Indonesia addresses global and regional challenges, especially amid escalating geopolitical tensions. As Southeast Asia grapples with increasing pressure from global power rivalries, Prabowo’s foreign policy approach will be closely examined for its ability to balance national security imperatives with the need to maintain Indonesia’s strategic autonomy.
This article explores the potential contours of Indonesia’s foreign policy under Prabowo Subianto, critically analyzing how his leadership may influence Indonesia’s role in the region and beyond. Employing neorealist theory as a framework, we will delve into how geopolitical calculations and security concerns are likely to shape Indonesia’s foreign policy. Additionally, we will draw on the concept of “middle power diplomacy” to assess Indonesia’s role as a key player in regional and global governance.
1. Prabowo’s Geopolitical Context: A Region in Flux
Prabowo Subianto assumes office at a critical juncture in global geopolitics. The Asia-Pacific region, particularly Southeast Asia, is increasingly becoming a theater of competition between major powers, primarily the United States and China. The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, aimed at countering China’s expanding influence, coupled with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has created a complex web of diplomatic, economic, and military interactions that Indonesia, as the largest Southeast Asian nation, cannot afford to ignore.
Moreover, the rise of multipolarity is further complicated by Russia’s resurgence in international affairs and its growing partnerships in Asia, including Prabowo’s planned visit to Moscow in 2024. Indonesia, traditionally adhering to a principle of “bebas aktif” (independent and active foreign policy), now faces the challenge of maintaining its non-aligned stance while navigating the increasing polarization in international relations. Prabowo’s military background signals a potential shift toward a more security-focused and pragmatic approach to these global challenges.
2. Neorealism and Indonesia’s Strategic Calculations
Neorealism, a theory in international relations, emphasizes the anarchic structure of the international system, where states operate under the assumption of self-help due to the absence of a central authority. This theory, championed by Kenneth Waltz in his seminal work Theory of International Politics (1979), posits that the behavior of states is primarily determined by the distribution of power in the international system rather than domestic factors or ideological motivations. For Waltz, the primary goal of states is survival, and their foreign policies are shaped by the need to ensure security in a competitive and uncertain international environment.
Analyzing Prabowo Subianto’s foreign policy through a neorealist lens reveals alignment with principles of balancing and hedging strategies that states employ to maximize security without becoming overly reliant on any single power bloc. As a middle power in a multipolar world, Indonesia must navigate the competing interests of major powers such as the U.S. and China, both of whom exert significant influence in Southeast Asia. Prabowo’s military background suggests a likely prioritization of security imperatives in his foreign policy calculations.
John Mearsheimer’s concept of offensive realism, articulated in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), argues that great powers seek to maximize their power relative to others to ensure survival. While Indonesia is not a great power, Mearsheimer’s logic can still be applied to Indonesia’s regional security dynamics. Prabowo’s approach may reflect a strategy to ensure that Indonesia remains influential within ASEAN while preventing any one power, particularly China, from dominating Southeast Asia. His outreach to countries like Japan, India, and Russia, alongside engagement with the U.S. and China, reflects a neorealist strategy of balancing—cooperating with multiple powers to prevent overdependence on any single one.
Prabowo’s efforts to diversify Indonesia’s defense partnerships illustrate the neorealist concept of balancing. His diplomatic visits to Russia and China, both non-traditional partners for Indonesia compared to Western powers, suggest an intent to broaden Indonesia’s defense options in a multipolar world. This aligns with Waltz’s argument that states will align with different powers to maintain their relative position and security in the international system. For instance, during his tenure as Minister of Defense, Prabowo secured agreements with both Russia for potential military procurement and France for defense modernization, demonstrating his intention to leverage relationships with multiple powers for Indonesia’s benefit.
In addition to balancing, neorealism posits that states engage in hedging to mitigate risks in a volatile international environment. Hedging involves simultaneously engaging with competing powers without fully committing to one, allowing a state to avoid making clear-cut alliances. This strategy is likely to characterize Prabowo’s foreign policy, as Indonesia continues to engage with both the U.S. and China. His diplomatic visits to ASEAN countries and beyond suggest an emphasis on maintaining strategic partnerships with both Western and non-Western actors, minimizing the risks of dependency or conflict.
Barry Buzan’s contributions to neorealism, particularly in People, States and Fear (1983), emphasize the importance of security in shaping state behavior. Buzan’s concept of the “security dilemma,” where efforts by one state to increase its security can inadvertently threaten others, is particularly relevant in the Southeast Asian context. Prabowo’s focus on defense and military modernization, while aimed at enhancing Indonesia’s security, could create tensions with neighboring countries or major powers that perceive Indonesia’s actions as a shift toward militarization. This tension is especially pronounced regarding China’s activities in the South China Sea and the broader U.S.-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.
Ultimately, neorealism offers a robust framework for understanding Prabowo’s foreign policy. It emphasizes that states, including Indonesia under Prabowo’s leadership, are primarily motivated by survival and security concerns in an anarchic international system. His outreach to multiple powers, focus on defense, and cautious balancing between global rivals reflect the core tenets of neorealism, positioning Indonesia to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape while safeguarding its strategic autonomy.
3. Middle Power Diplomacy: Indonesia’s Global Role
Indonesia has long been regarded as a “middle power,” a state that, while not a great power, possesses significant regional influence and the ability to mediate in global governance. The concept of middle power diplomacy is relevant in analyzing Prabowo’s foreign policy, as Indonesia has historically sought to play a constructive role in fostering regional stability, promoting multilateralism, and championing the interests of developing nations.
Prabowo’s leadership presents both opportunities and challenges for Indonesia’s middle power diplomacy. On one hand, his strong national security focus may enhance Indonesia’s ability to project influence in regional security matters, such as counterterrorism, maritime security, and conflict resolution. His extensive diplomatic engagements in ASEAN, including visits to Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia in 2024, highlight his recognition of ASEAN’s centrality in Indonesia’s foreign policy. ASEAN, as the cornerstone of regional multilateralism, provides Indonesia with a platform to lead regional initiatives and mitigate external pressures from global powers.
Prabowo’s engagement with ASEAN also signals his commitment to reinforcing ASEAN unity in the face of external challenges, such as the South China Sea dispute and China’s growing assertiveness. Under Prabowo, Indonesia may seek to strengthen ASEAN’s role in managing these disputes by advocating for peaceful resolutions and adherence to international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). His ability to navigate these issues will be crucial in maintaining Indonesia’s credibility as a regional leader.
On the global stage, Prabowo’s pragmatism may lead Indonesia to adopt a more assertive role in multilateral forums such as the United Nations, G20, and Non-Aligned Movement. Given his defense background, Prabowo may also advocate for stronger global cooperation on security issues, such as nuclear non-proliferation, cybersecurity, and transnational crime. However, his emphasis on defense could also result in tensions with Western powers, particularly if Indonesia continues to engage with countries like Russia and China, which are viewed as strategic competitors by the West.
4. Geopolitical Challenges: Navigating the Indo-Pacific and Beyond
Prabowo’s foreign policy will be shaped by the broader geopolitical challenges facing the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S.-China rivalry remains the most significant external factor affecting Southeast Asia, and Indonesia’s ability to maintain its strategic autonomy will depend on how it navigates this complex landscape.
One key issue for Indonesia under Prabowo’s leadership will be the South China Sea, where China’s territorial claims and military activities have raised tensions with several ASEAN countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines. Although Indonesia is not a direct claimant in the dispute, China’s nine-dash line overlaps with Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone around the Natuna Islands, creating potential flashpoints for conflict. Prabowo will need to carefully balance Indonesia’s relations with China while safeguarding the nation’s territorial integrity.
In addition to the South China Sea, Prabowo will also need to manage Indonesia’s relations with the U.S. and its Indo-Pacific strategy. The U.S. has been pushing for greater military cooperation with Southeast Asian countries to counter China’s influence, and Indonesia has participated in joint military exercises with the U.S. However, Prabowo’s desire to maintain Indonesia’s non-aligned stance may limit the extent to which Indonesia aligns itself with U.S. strategic goals.
Prabowo’s planned visit to Russia in 2024 further complicates Indonesia’s geopolitical positioning. While Russia is not a dominant player in Southeast Asia, its increasing presence in Asia, coupled with its strategic partnership with China, adds another layer of complexity to Indonesia’s foreign policy. Prabowo’s outreach to Russia suggests that Indonesia may seek to leverage its relationships with non-Western powers to bolster its strategic autonomy, but this could also strain relations with Western partners.
5. Conclusion
As Indonesia’s new president, Prabowo Subianto will face significant geopolitical challenges that will require a nuanced and pragmatic approach to foreign policy. His military background suggests a greater emphasis on defense and security, which could result in a more assertive stance in regional security matters. However, Prabowo’s foreign policy is likely to be shaped by a balancing act between major powers, as Indonesia seeks to preserve its strategic autonomy while navigating the increasingly polarized international landscape.
Employing neorealist theory, we can predict that Prabowo’s foreign policy will prioritize Indonesia’s security and survival in the face of external pressures. At the same time, Indonesia’s role as a middle power will continue to drive its engagement in regional and global diplomacy, particularly through ASEAN and multilateral forums. Prabowo’s leadership offers both opportunities and risks for Indonesia’s foreign policy, and his ability to manage these challenges will determine Indonesia’s position in the evolving geopolitical order. As the world enters a new phase of geopolitical competition, Indonesia under Prabowo will need to carefully navigate the shifting dynamics to secure its place as a stable and influential player in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.